In November, multiple Belgian airports (Brussels, Liège and Charleroi) temporarily stopped operations after repeated drone disruptions. Since the beginning of October, drones have been repeatedly spotted above Belgian military bases and training establishments, airports, the Port of Antwerp, and the Doel nuclear power plant. These intrusions have served as a real stress test for Belgium's security architecture, exposing its insufficient readiness to respond and prompting defence assistance from neighboring European countries. Belgium's experience is part of a broader pattern across Europe. Russia has violated the airspace of at least 14 EU member states, with hundreds of drones and three fighter jets entering the EU airspace and a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen temporarily losing its GPS signal in Bulgaria. The most resonant case occurred in Poland, when in early September the country was attacked with 21 drones, resulting in an Article 4 consultation within NATO.
As Russian drones get increasingly bold flying around the airspace of Belgium and the rest of the EU, collecting information about the state of military sites and critical infrastructure, the European Union struggles to find means to fund its security and provide military support to Ukraine, a country that is holding back the Russian attempt at a greater assault on the EU as the Russian threat becomes increasingly tangible.
Providing direct military support to Ukraine through grants and debt becomes increasingly difficult as major EU Member States, like Germany, France and Poland, are facing budgetary constraints due to increased governmental debt.
Against this background, the European Commission has tabled an innovative proposal to use Russian frozen assets to mobilise €140bn, which can fund Ukraine for several years, at least until 2027. Several options are still on the table, with high-level political talks accelerating in the past few days. A major blow could be dealt to Russia's flailing economy by funding Ukraine through these funds.
However, at the last European Council, EU leaders could not reach an agreement to support the initiative primarily due to the Belgian position, with Prime Minister Bart De Wever voicing concerns over the legality and financial risks of such an initiative.
Legal concerns
Under the Commission's plan, €140 billion of Russia's Central Bank frozen reserves would be used as collateral to issue an interest-free reparations loan for Ukraine, which it would only repay upon receiving war reparations from Russia. In this way, the funds would not be seized, and the EU would replace the Russian cash on Euroclear accounts with bonds issued by the European Commission. While state-owned property is generally protected from seizure or expropriation, international law provides an exception when a state commits serious wrongdoing. In such situations, other countries may temporarily suspend certain obligations toward the responsible state in order to force it to comply with international law. Accordingly, the expropriation of Russian frozen assets could be lawfully undertaken until Russia ends its aggression and pays reparations for the damages caused.
Bart De Wever stated that sovereign assets have never been seized before. However, they were used in similar levies, such as USD 50bn from Iraq to Kuwait, as well as other seizures from Iran, Iraq, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Libya and Italy, Germany and Japan in the last century.
Risk of retaliation
Belgium has expressed fears of potential legal claims or arbitration from Russia if the frozen assets are used in this manner. Prime Minister De Wever has emphasised (rightfully so) the need for shared risk among EU member states, stating, "Taking Putin's money and leaving the risks with us. That's not going to happen… let me be very clear about that."
Mr De Wever particularly referred to the possibility of Russia filing a claim before an investment tribunal under the 1989 Belgium-Luxembourg-Soviet Union investment treaty. While the treaty might allow the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to initiate a dispute, its chances of winning are extremely low, and any proceedings might take decades.
Investment tribunals interpret treaties in line with higher principles of international law. Russia's violation of peremptory norms and the CBR's role in the aggression, especially given Russia's own seizure of European assets like those of Total, Danone, and Carlsberg, would weigh heavily against it. Investment tribunals also recognise lawful countermeasures in response to another State's wrongful acts. Case law further distinguishes between compensable and non-compensable expropriation, meaning no compensation is required when a measure serves a legitimate public purpose, is non-discriminatory, proportionate, and taken in good faith. Thus, no compensation is required. Ex iniuria ius non oritur—law does not arise from wrongdoing, so Russia has no quick and direct claim. Additionally, all of the above would only apply in the case of actual asset seizure and not in the scenario in which Russian assets are used as collateral for a loan.
The cost of inaction
While the Belgian government fears the price it might pay if the Russian threats to take revenge for the asset expropriation materialise, what cost would we pay if we don't do it?
In the past few months, Russia has already shown how it can effectively disrupt the Belgian economy with drone interference. According to estimates, the cost of one airport disruption incident could easily exceed €2 million, with possibly much higher losses once indirect costs are calculated. Russian sabotage operations against Europe already include all types of critical infrastructure: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, water, digital infrastructure, and government facilities (including military installations). While difficult to estimate, Europe has already lost several billion euros due to these hybrid acts of aggression.
A clear political choice lies ahead for Belgium in December. Do we want to return money to an aggressor that already undermines our national security and would likely use those funds to intensify its attacks? Or do we choose to help preserve Ukraine's sovereignty while strengthening Europe's deterrence and capacity for self-defence?
In 1990, 2008 and 2014, Europe hesitated. Each time, war broke out, and the cost grew. Today, Belgium holds Europe's key financial leverage over the Kremlin. Hesitation now will cost Belgium and Europe much more later.
A chance to lead
We thus have a chance to be the driver of strengthening the European defence, security, and global influence, while reinforcing the international rule of law. Moreover, by taking a leadership role in the process, it can determine how exactly the reparation loan mechanism would work. Many times in history, Belgium was at the forefront of ambitious diplomatic progress. Belgium led Europe in building institutions capable of preventing war, and now is a chance to do it again.
Appeasing Russia or bending to its threats will not ensure the EU's long-term peace and security. Moscow's pressure is a sign that it fears EU unity regarding the confiscation of frozen assets. Burden-sharing is legitimate, and practical solutions do exist, as Norway recently showed willingness to explore creative ideas with EU Member States. Belgium's national interests do not have to coincide with Euroclear's short-termist and numbers-driven approach. By promoting robust collective EU action at the European Council meeting in December, Prime Minister Bart De Wever can play a decisive leadership role in helping to end Russia's war against Ukraine and restore peace and justice in Europe. The time to act is now.